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Abstract 
Social norms have been included in the theory of collective action to overcome difficulties in explaining 
why commons may perform better when self-regulated. The role of trust has been identified in several 
contexts of local social dilemmas, but only recently has been extended to global commons, based on 
large descriptive evidence collected by Elinor Ostrom. However, no quantitative evidence was 
available until now. Using a dataset of 29 European countries over the period 1990-2007, we provide 
empirical evidence in favor of the role of trust in global dilemmas. We find that trust has a negative 
impact on greenhouse gas emissions, whose extrapolation to Spain would imply a reduction in 
emissions of 12.5% if Spaniards would trust each other as Swedish people do. 
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1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the principal challenges of this century. We observe two main patterns in the way human
beings deal with this issue. At the global level, the day of a binding agreement including all principal emitters and
targeting a sharp reduction in worldwide greenhouse gas emissions is still to come, although recent Conferences of
the Parties suggested a potential deadline for binding abatement targets in 2020. Stalling negotiations are in line
with the main theory of collective action, predicting large free-rider behavior and thus huge diﬃculties in solving
this type of global public good dilemma (cf. Olson 1965; Hardin 1968). Despite most governments are reticent to
engage in coordinated international policies, examples of unilateral policies, local actions and individual ecological
behaviors are however increasingly available. A small set of countries already adopted carbon taxes to stimulate
a shift toward a greener economy (Baranzini and Carattini 2013). In this paper, we aim to contribute to explain
why countries and individuals may adopt or accept emissions reduction behaviors and policies, in spite of the global
public good characteristics of climate change.
We draw on the contributions of Elinor Ostrom and other institutional scholars and apply an empirical framework
to determine countries greenhouse gas emissions. In our paper we focus on the importance of social norms, and in
particular of trust, in the determination of individual and collective behaviors. As highlighted by Ostrom and Ahn
(2003): The ideas fundamental to the social capital approach cannot be entirely captured by the ﬁrst-generation
collective-action theories that tend to reduce `cultural' aspects such as trust, trustworthiness, and norms to incentives
embedded in social structures of interaction. [...] Trustworthiness is an independent and nonreducible reason why
some communities achieve collective action while other fail (p. xvi).
The concept of trust, understood as mirroring an expectation of trustworthiness, has been applied to the problem
of common pool resources and local environmental public goods to explain why self-organized solutions may perform
better than regulated environments. A recurrent illustration refers to water management in developing countries:
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ﬁeld evidence shows that overuse could be lower with self-management than with external control, i.e. the common
prisoner's dilemma does not necessarily hold when people trust each other (cf. Joshi et al. 2000). Out of the
environmental sphere, the concept of trust has been used in the development literature, in particular by Fukuyama
(1995), who elects trust as the key social value for sustained economic growth, and by Knack and Keefer (1997)
and Zak and Knack (2001), who show the positive role that trust plays in supporting growth.
In this paper, we aim to explore whether trust has an impact on greenhouse gas emissions, by referring con-
ceptually to the literature criticizing the conventional collective action theory based on local and communitarian
environmental solutions, while borrowing the empirical methodology from applications in development economics.
Our is not the ﬁrst attempt to relate social norms, namely trust, with global public goods such as climate change.
The seminal paper of Ostrom (2009) already disputes the validity of the traditional view, which contends that
the global scale of climate change hampers the emergence of grassroots collective action and dispersed forms of
unilateral action, i.e. cooperation is even more unlikely than with local issues. Supported by the collection of case,
ﬁeld and laboratory studies presented in Poteete et al. (2010), Ostrom stresses the limits of conventional theory
arguing that it can fail to predict the realized outcome also with global issues, especially whenever participants
see each other as trustworthy (i.e. eﬀective reciprocators). In particular, she suggests that the same mechanism
of trust that leads commons to be successfully managed by self-organized institutions could be eﬀective also with
global issues. That is, in a given context, individuals can commit to reduce their own emissions and comply with
their commitment, since they trust that others are also sharing the same responsibility and engaging in the same
social behavior. To see this mechanism at work, we need to scale down the focus from the global perspective. Thus
we can realize how social norms help overcoming the global property of climate change, promoting eﬀective local
eﬀorts.
In the empirical side, Grafton and Knowles (2004) propose a series of cross-sectional regressions attempting to
identify an eﬀect of social capital on several measures of local environmental performance. They ﬁnd very little
evidence in favor of an eﬀect of social capital, including trust. The authors point to a series of empirical diﬃculties
related to the dataset, concerning both the measures of social capital and of environmental quality, which could
explain the negative outcome.
Our aim is to generalize Ostrom's intuition and to assess whether the eﬀect of trust is visible not only in small-
sized case studies, but also at an aggregated level. In this way, we improve the seminal contribution of Grafton and
Knowles (2004) in four ways. First, the measure of environmental quality that we use concerns global pollutants
rather than local contaminants, i.e. greenhouse gas emissions. We thus test the full extent of Ostrom's hypothesis
on global dilemmas. Second, this measure is compatible across time and countries and does not present the weakness
of indices and similar built-in measures of environmental quality. Third, we use a larger set of data that allows
for multivariate panel analysis and ﬁxed eﬀects, which limit the risk of omitted variable bias and allow focusing
on changes over time. This framework, along with a larger set of control variables, ensures more robust results.
Fourth, our dataset of European countries is composed by relatively similar economies, also contributing to reduce
the bias possibly caused by missing variables.
Hence, we perform an econometric analysis assessing the eﬀect of trust on greenhouse gas emissions. We end up
with a negative coeﬃcient implying a decline in emissions of 0.24% following a percentage increase in trust, ceteris
paribus. This fresh evidence is in line with the updated theory of collective action and supports its underlying
economic intuition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic motivations. Section 3
presents the data, discusses the methodological issues related with the measure of trust and describes the econometric
strategy. Section 4 focuses on empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
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Figure 1: From trust to greenhouse gas emissions.
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Note: Own ﬁgure based on Poteete et al. (2010). According to the authors, the level of trust that other participators are reciprocators aﬀects
the level of cooperation and in turn generates a beneﬁcial outcome, which in this framework would be a reduction in emissions. The eﬀect of
trust on emissions goes through three channels, as described in the text, represented by the numbers 1,2 and 3. Paths A to I are detailed below.
2 Linking trust and greenhouse gas emissions
We expect trust to have a threefold impact on greenhouse gas emissions. First, trust may have a direct eﬀect by
promoting pro-social and environmentally-conscious behavior at the individual level (e.g. biking to work rather
than driving), as illustrated by the large survey in this ﬁeld of Pretty and Ward (2001) and Poteete et al. (2010).
According to the latter, trust plays a crucial role as the norm deﬁning the actual level of cooperation (cf. Figure
1): if agents acting in a given context perceive most individuals as reciprocators (i.e. trustworthy), we may expect
them to adopt a more cooperative behavior (e.g. pro-environmental). In this way, trust generates reciprocity: a
mechanism based on the social obligation to reciprocate leads people to invest in collective action being conﬁdent
on other people doing the same (Pretty and Ward 2001).
Second, trust may have an impact on local, regional and national environmental policy as it inﬂuences collective
action. Whereas there is some theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the eﬀect of environmental policy on
trust and intrinsic motivation, suggesting a crowding-out if the policy change makes agents less trustful (see e.g.
Frey 1997; Cardenas et al. 2000; Frey and Jegen 2001) and a crowding-in if the policy change makes agents more
trustful (Ostrom 2009), the reverse link from trust to environmental policy is still largely unexplored. Consistently
with Ostrom (2009) and Grafton and Knowles (2004), we expect a positive relation from trust to environmental
policy. In particular, Ostrom's analysis concludes that trust and environmental policy are indeed complements:
in some cases, only collective action allows policies to exist and be followed in a manageable way (i.e. without
excessive costs of enforcement). Trust is thus the key for having diligent and proactive citizens. She explains in this
way the large list of environmental programs undertaken at any level (municipal, regional, inter-regional, etc.) and
mentioned in her work.
Yet, we acknowledge that in absence of trust (or at very low levels) there may be some substitution between
policy and trust. For instance, Baranzini et al. (2010) consider a global public good problem such as tropical forest
conservation and ﬁnd that when people do not expect spontaneous eﬀorts by the others, they prefer to contribute
to a mechanism which is strict and enforceable (i.e. a hypothetical global tax) compared to a mechanism based
on voluntary agreements (i.e. a voluntary fund for forest conservation). However, one would argue that in such
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situation it would be unclear who would promote such a policy. In reality there is no global tax to protect tropical
forests. In our view, in spite of the positive demand for environmental policy, the latter fails to rise due to the
same reason that leads to the development of its demand, i.e. the lack of trust. That is, at very low levels of trust
we may see a pattern of substitutability on the demand side which is however not matched by policy suppliers (i.e.
institutions, since collective action is lacking). We thus suggest that pro-social behavior and policy are more likely
to go hand in hand rather than be substitutes.
Further evidence in this sense comes from a growing body of literature following an environmental psychological
approach. Stern et al. (1999) theorize how engagement in collective action aiming at aﬀecting climate policy, both
actively (e.g. writing letters, contributing ﬁnancially to environmental movements, demonstrating, i.e. environ-
mental citizenship and activism) and passively (e.g. accepting higher taxes), responds to a feeling of obligation to
contribute to the provision of a collective good. In this framework, social and personal norms interact and contex-
tual factors such as social expectations and trust contribute to explain pro-environmental behavior in the public
sphere along with moral motivations (Stern 2000). Survey-based empirical evidence supports this norm-activation
mechanism, by using measures of policy-related collective action such as e.g. being in favor of higher energy prices
(i.e. energy taxes), of subsidies to energy eﬃciency and renewables, signing petitions for tighter environmental laws,
supporting green taxation of imports, and so forth (see e.g. Stern et al. 1999; Gaerling et al. 2003; Steg et al. 2005
and the survey of Steg and Vlek 2009).
Third, trust may inﬂuence emissions through an additional channel, namely economic growth (see Knack and
Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001). However, our focus is on trust and collective action toward environmental-
friendly changes. For that reason, our empirical strategy is limited to the impact of trust on environmental behavior
and policy.
Figure 1 summarizes. The mechanism of Poteete et al. (2010) is updated by introducing the link between trust
and greenhouse gas emissions. This link is represented by path A. In detail, however, we expect this eﬀect to go
through lower energy consumption (path B). In this sense, energy consumption acts as a mediator, in the spirit of
Baron and Kenny (1986). Indeed, we would expect an increase in pro-environmental behavior (C) to lead to lower
energy consumption (path E), as we would expect local, regional and national environmental policy to do it (paths
D and F). In theory, both individual behavior and policy could also aﬀect emissions without passing by the level of
energy consumption, e.g. by aﬀecting the energy-mix (i.e. technological development and adoption). That is why
we include two dashed arrows for paths G and H1. Path I corresponds to the eﬀect of trust to emissions through
economic growth, which is omitted in our empirical framework. Finally, following Poteete et al. (2010), we add
a feedback mechanism, reinforcing the existing pattern. In the case of climate change, direct beneﬁts of climate
policies or green behavior may not be visible for the individual, but those eﬀorts could contribute to more perceptible
local co-beneﬁts, e.g. in terms of better air quality. However, we do not expect this eﬀect to be particularly large
as to be an issue for identiﬁcation.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data sources and measurement issues
We access the Eurostat database for 30 European countries over 1990-2007, namely the 27 members of the European
Union as well as the EFTA members Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Our sample includes 9 transition economies.
Greece is not included in the estimations, due to missing values. Eurostat provides the data for all the explicative
variables used in the econometric model except trust, which comes from the World Values Survey (WVS)2. The
1Path H relates to the so-called Porter hypothesis (see Baranzini and Carattini 2013 and Ambec et al. 2013 for an empirical
review; Acemoglu et al. 2012 for a theoretical analysis).
2See Table 4 for data sources.
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variable trust that we use in this study is the share of respondents marking the answer Most people can be trusted
when asked In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing
with other people?. The alternative answer is You cannot be too careful in dealing with other people. The
number of individuals surveyed depends on both timing and country: observations vary between a minimum of 375
(for Malta in 1991) and a maximum of 2574 (for Belgium in 1990). In general, the largest part of our values is given
by a sample reaching or exceeding the symbolic threshold of 1000 individuals.
Unfortunately, we do not possess yearly observations for trust, given that the survey is administered sporadically
and with diﬀerent timing across countries (i.e. one wave can take more than one year to be completed). The latest
available wave is of 2007. For this reason, the sample ends in 2007 and is composed by a theoretical maximum of
540 observations. Countries included in the sample represent more than 10% of world greenhouse gas emissions
(UNEP 2012).
Main descriptive statistics are provided by Table 1. Greenhouse gas emissions present very large variation,
since they depend closely on the economy's size. In per capita terms, each European citizen emits about 11 tons
of CO2-equivalent emissions per year on average over the observed period. As shown by Figure 2, per capita
greenhouse gas emissions decreased in European countries in the early 90s and leveled oﬀ thereafter. However, in
the case of transition economies, the early 90s are characterized by a sharp change in the economic structure and
a heavy collapse of output resulting in a strong decrease in emissions. Afterward, transition economies switched
to a recovery path, but emissions lagged behind until 2000. All this suggests dealing carefully with this subset of
countries.
Manufacturing represents on average about 20% of European GDP. Since Eurostat does not include mining and
fossil fuel extraction in the category manufacturing (but only fossil fuels reﬁning), we decide to add mining and
resource extraction to manufacturing whenever data are available (cf. Xu and Ang 2013). This is economically
justiﬁed by the large energy-intensity of mining and resource extraction, which we relate to the so-called composition
eﬀect. Looking at the data, we see an important structural change taking place in European economies during
the 90s and the 2000s, with the largest drops in manufacturing share being related with transition economies (from
more than 30% of GDP to 20% in about two decades).
As it is common in the literature, trade is given by the sum of imports and exports over GDP (trade intensity
ratio). Trade openness evolves similarly for both transition and Western European economies, with the average
level of trade moving from about 40% of GDP in 1990 to slightly less than 60% in 2007. However, cross-country
diﬀerences are important. On average, transition economies are related to larger trade openness. Still, Western
small open economies such as Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg or Malta show even larger values.
Our main variable of interest is trust. Data inspection shows some supportive variation over time in the level
of trust3. For instance, trust in Spain moved from 34.3% in 1990 up to 39.8% in 1995, but then decreased to 34%
in 2000 and 20% in 2007. Trust also possesses a large variation between countries. Although the average shows
moderate levels of trust for Europe (i.e. one out of three respondents stating that most people are trustworthy),
extremes indicate relatively low levels of trust for Cyprus, Portugal and Romania (with values below 10%) and
large levels of trust at the other end of the spectrum, mainly related with Scandinavian countries (about two out
of three respondents trusting most people).
Since trust is not directly observable, it can only be approximated from individual perceptions in surveys. A
long list of potential biases could raise from survey measures, such as selection issues, translation diﬃculties (i.e.
diﬀerent framing) and response bias (cf. Knack and Keefer 1997). For example, in their study about trust and
3We start with 84 values for trust and interpolate linearly to reach 340 observations. In a conservative vein, we do not extrapolate.
Furthermore, by extrapolating we would have had to deal with negative (thus zero) values, which is a very extreme case. Still, the
number of observations used for the estimations varies depending on the completeness of control variables. Own computations show
that the way we ipolate does not have a particular impact on the empirical ﬁndings in the next section, e.g. by applying cubic or cubic
spline ipolations and multiple imputation techniques. We matched the WVS measures of trust for Great Britain and West Germany
with Eurostat variables for United Kingdom and Germany, respectively (cf. Knack and Keefer 1997).
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economic growth, Knack and Keefer (1997) point to a selection bias related to the WVS measure of trust may
leading to over-correlation with education and income. However, they argue that this issue mainly applies to
developing countries. Ostrom and Ahn (2003) present other drawbacks of survey measures related to trust. For
instance, it seems that measures from the General Social Survey, another large-scale survey similar to the WVS but
administered only to the US population, do not lead to good forecasts of individual cooperation in the lab.
However, other studies reviewed by Ostrom and Ahn (2003) provide a more optimistic picture, showing that
although general survey questions may struggle to depict the trust pattern (e.g. if a participant trust the other
participants when playing ﬁrst), they are generally successful in predicting trustworthiness (e.g. the amount of
money given back by trustees if players in the ﬁrst round decide to trust). Furthermore, Knack and Keefer (1997)
not only provide a list of potential risks linked to the WVS measure of trust, but also favorable evidence for its
application. In particular, they test whether the ambiguous terminology used in the question (i.e. the reference to
most people) may lead respondents to think to other people as their family, which is not necessarily the scope of
trust for our study, since we are interested in trust in the others in a large sense4. The authors point out that in
low-trust countries a large share of interactions probably occurs within the family, which could eventually lead to a
bias. Yet, they ﬁnd a low correlation (of 0.24) between the WVS measure of trust and the measure of trust in the
family. We are thus more conﬁdent that our variable measures trust in the others in a large sense. The authors also
look at the nexus between the WVS measure of trust and the share of returned wallets in a cross-country experiment
wherein wallets were lost with 50$ in cash and a card with the owner's contact, ﬁnding a supportive correlation
of 0.67. In addition, correlations tend to get higher when controlling for income per capita (thus trying to simulate
the reaction to a purchasing-power-adjusted lost wallet, i.e. testing individual's real trustworthiness)5.
In the same vein, we examine the link between the measure that we choose for this study (Most people can
be trusted) and additional measures of trust that were included in the WVS, although for some waves only. In
particular, we consider the answers to the questions Trust: other people in country, Do you think most people
try to take advantage of you?, Trust: people you know personally, Trust: people you meet for the ﬁrst time and
Trust: your neighborhood. This investigation conﬁrms our priors. Trusting other people in country is positively
correlated with the measure of trust that we use. We ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant links both in correlation tables
and with panel regressions for both the positive answers, viz. Trust completely and Trust a little, as well as for
the sum of the two6. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that the national measure of trust that we include in our empirical
framework makes sense and captures a plausible range of social interactions to be linked with collective action.
Take advantage of you is very highly correlated with trust (correlation of 0.88). The correlation is positive
since the variable is coded in a scale over 10 points whose maximum indicates an expectation of full fair treatment.
Take advantage of you and Most people can be trusted provide diﬀerent and comparable answers to a very
similar question, simply framed diﬀerently. This is very helpful since it allows for double checking respondent's
answers (although framing may matter).
Not surprisingly, both Trust: people you know personally and Trust: people you meet for the ﬁrst time are
strongly correlated between themselves (0.75) and with Most people can be trusted (0.6 and 0.72, respectively).
Since trust is self-reinforcing and can be accumulated, it follows from practice that people tend to apply their own
experience in shaping their everyday behavior while interacting with new agents (Pretty and Ward 2001).
The correlations for Trust: your neighborhood goes in the same direction. It is correlated at 0.84 and 0.86
with Trust: people you know personally and Trust: people you meet for the ﬁrst time, respectively, and at 0.6
4More precisely, we shall say that we mainly focus on intrinsic reciprocity rather than instrumental reciprocity. Knack and
Keefer (1997) use the term generalized trust referring to the same concept. Cf. Sobel (2005) for a discussion on terminology and
sound economics of reciprocity.
5See also Grafton and Knowles (2004) for a similar discussion.
6All following measures except Take advantage of you are coded according to the following answers: Trust completely, Trust
a little, Not trust very much and Not trust at all. We use the two positive answers and their sum (as percentage share of total
answers).
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Figure 2: Evolution of GHG emissions per capita over 1990-2007 for the whole sample and subsets of countries.
Note: Own ﬁgure.
with Most people can be trusted. The evidence concerning the last three variables is encouraging since we focus
on a global dilemma that needs to be dealt with through cooperation between people at diﬀerent scales. That is, it
seems that social context matters and at diﬀerent levels7. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that the variable trust that
we chose from the WVS has the potential for performing well and can thus be used in quantitative studies, even
in the case it would measure more trustworthiness than trust (cf. Knack and Keefer 1997; Pretty and Ward 2001;
Ostrom and Ahn 2003). Moreover, we are reassured that our measure performs well in explaining trust between
citizens of the same country as well as in narrower contexts.
3.2 Econometric approach
Starting from earlier empirical works on environmental quality (see in particular Antweiler et al. 2001) and following
the previous discussion on trust and emissions, we may suppose that the relevant drivers of per capita greenhouse
gas emissions are the level of per capita income, the economy's composition, the economy's openness to trade and
the level of trust as given in the following equation:
Emissionsi,t = αi+ β1GDP i,t+ β2Manufacturingi,t+ β3Tradei,t
+β4Trusti,t+ i,t (1)
where Emissionsi,t stands for per capita greenhouse gas emissions at time t in country i (in log); GDPi,t is
real GDP per capita (in log); Manufacturingi,t is the aggregated industrial sector's share in the economy; Tradei,t
7All correlations we refer to are statistically signiﬁcant at least at 10%. However, further studies are needed to have more robust
results. Indeed, all these variables are not included in all WVS waves as it is Most people can be trusted. Hence, the explanatory
power is limited by the small number of available observations.
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measures trade openness; Trusti,t is the share of population showing trust as measured by the WVS; ai is a country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect and ei,t represents the error term.
The estimated coeﬃcients can be directly interpreted in terms of elasticities, since all variables are in logs or in
shares.
The use of panel-data methods allows for diﬀerent speciﬁcations, in particular the use of ﬁxed- and random-
eﬀects estimators. In their seminal contribution, Antweiler et al. (2001) evaluate the limits of one or the other
approach in a very similar framework where they have a panel of 293 observation sites measuring sulfur emissions
in 109 urban areas across 44 countries, looking for the eﬀect of trade on emissions. In particular, they remark that
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators treating country-speciﬁc excluded variables as constants are appropriate when the aim is to
apply the model to the countries in the sample, as we do. In our framework, it would be diﬃcult to argue that our
set is a random draw of countries from a larger underlying population. Inconsistency related to omitted variables
would be the consequence of applying random eﬀects when not appropriate, whereas the intrinsic drawback of a
ﬁxed-eﬀects model is represented by the ﬁxed eﬀects themselves, i.e. the need of simplifying the model by assuming
country eﬀects to be constant and focusing on variation over time. The Hausman test (Hausman 1978) supports
the theoretical arguments. As a consequence, we introduce country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in (1)8.
Except for trust, the determinants of emissions included in (1) are standard with respect to the literature. We
control for structural changes in the composition of the economy using the share of manufacturing, following Cole
(2000), Cole (2004) and Buehn and Farzanegan (2013). Then, we take into account the remaining eﬀect of income
per capita, similarly to e.g. Antweiler et al. (2001). Observing the eﬀect of trade openness is central in Antweiler
et al. (2001) and in other works dealing with geographical carbon leakage. De Melo and Mathys (2010) review
the main links between trade and the environment: trade liberalization may increase economic activity (but we
already control for GDP per capita), it may lead to specialization, displacement of polluting activities and structural
changes (but we already control for most energy-intensive industries) and it may aﬀect the type of technology used to
produce goods and services within the country. We expect the measure of trade openness to capture predominantly
the last eﬀect.
Energy consumption is a very recurrent control variable in the literature (cf. Buehn and Farzanegan 2013), but it
is not included in model (1), which estimates path A in Figure 1, i.e. the direct eﬀect of trust on emissions. Energy
consumption enters model (2), whose role is twofold. First, it tests the eﬀect of energy consumption on emissions,
which is expected to be positive and signiﬁcant (path B). Second, it tests for residual mediation. Provided that
equation (1) shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect of trust on emissions, if energy mediates trust, the relation between the latter
and emissions should be no longer signiﬁcant, or at least substantially reduced9. Model (2) is given as follows:
Emissionsi,t = αi+ β1GDP i,t+ β2Manufacturingi,t+ β3Tradei,t
+β4Trusti,t+ β5Energyi,t+ i,t (2)
where Energyi,t stands for per capita gross inland energy consumption (in log). A last step is required for
mediation, testing the eﬀect of trust on energy (paths C plus D). If energy is a valid mediator, the coeﬃcient for
trust should be signiﬁcant. Model (3) displays then an analogous speciﬁcation for energy consumption:
8The Hausman test rejects the null of always consistent random-eﬀect estimators with a Chi-2(5)=80.12 and Chi-2(4)=8.32 with
and without per capita energy consumption, respectively (p-value of 0.0000 and 0.0804). Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
for random eﬀects gives Chi-2(1)=1025.08 and Chi-2(1)=1161.83, respectively (p-value of 0.0000 in both cases).
9Baron and Kenny (1986) refers to perfect mediation when the residual eﬀect of the independent variable on the dependent variable
controlling for the mediator is zero. In this framework, a positive residual eﬀect would imply that the eﬀect of trust on emissions would
be mediated also by the energy-mix, i.e. paths G and H. Instead, a non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for trust would suggest that almost all
mediation goes through energy consumption, although we would refrain from calling it perfect mediation for straightforward empirical
reasons. In our view, this is the best way to assess the impact of trust on the energy-mix, which is hardly available in the data. Hence,
we omit a speciﬁc model for this path but still test its plausibility adding some variables to the main speciﬁcations (see next section).
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Energyi,t = αi+ β1GDP i,t+ β2Manufacturingi,t+ β3Tradei,t+ β4Trusti,t+ i,t (3)
In theory, additional levels of mediation could be tested. For instance, paths C and D could be tested by e.g.
controlling whether environmental policy does act as a mediator for trust to energy consumption and in what extent.
However, we face important shortage of data on policy, as discussed in the next section.
To summarize, the expected impacts of included variables are the following:
 Real income per capita (+): although there is no clear-cutting evidence on the precise role of income per capita
on global emissions, a general consensus points to a positive eﬀect due to the dominance of the so-called scale
eﬀect.
 Manufacturing (+): we expect industry to be on average more emissions-intensive than services and an increase
in the share of manufacturing to be positively related with emissions.
 Trade (±): there is no conclusive evidence on the eﬀect of trade on emissions, even if we control for income
per capita and manufacturing.
 Trust (): trust is supposed to foster collective action toward cleaner goods, greener attitudes and more
eﬀective environmental policy. We thus expect trust to decrease emissions by reducing energy consumption.
 Energy (+): energy consumption is directly and positively linked with emissions, provided that energy sources
are mainly fossil fuels.
We discuss the outcome of the estimations in the next section.
4 Empirical results
Estimation results for models (1), (2) and (3) are displayed by Table 2. Column (1) and (2) exhibits the estimates for
model (1), testing the direct eﬀect of trust on greenhouse gas emissions (path A)10. Column (1) includes transition
economies, whereas all other columns do not. Regressions in columns (1) and (2) provide very large goodness
of ﬁt, which are however in large part driven by ﬁxed eﬀects, as shown by the diﬀerence between overall-R2 and
within-R2. Robustness tests for model (1) without transition economies are shown in Table 2. Results are robust
both to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Indeed, the Wald test rejects the null of homoskedasticity in our
panel, as well as the Breusch-Pagan (Cook-Weisberg) test. We thus allow errors to be heteroscedastic in Table 2,
where model (1) is estimated using heteroscedastic-consistent White standard errors and bootstrapped standard
errors (with 50 replications), cf. columns (2) and (3), respectively. Signiﬁcance is only slightly reduced. Then,
the Wooldridge test for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. We also allow
for autocorrelation in the residuals estimating Driscoll-Kraay heteroscedastic and autocorrelated standard errors,
cf. column (3). Coeﬃcients of interest are still statistically signiﬁcant. This holds true for the whole sample, i.e.
including transition economies. We also test for multicollinearity: for model (1) mean variance inﬂation factor is
6.96 with ﬁxed eﬀect, 1.35 without. Both values are below the common threshold value of 10, the second is even
below the more restrictive threshold value of 5. Multicollinearity is not an issue also for model (2), which includes
energy consumption as a regressor, and model (3).
We start commenting reported estimates in Table 2 by focusing on columns (1) and (2). Coeﬃcients for most
control variables behave as expected. Since we control for manufacturing (a proxy for the composition eﬀect),
10The model is assumed to be linear and estimated with OLS. Given the data available we consider linear regression as the best tool
for estimating empirically the link between trust and greenhouse gas emissions.
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the coeﬃcient for GDP per capita is supposed to capture both scale and technique eﬀect11. This coeﬃcient is
negative and signiﬁcant with the full sample (1), but it becomes positive and signiﬁcant when transition countries
are excluded from the sample (2). The case of transition economies is exceptional. For instance, Millock et al.
(2008) ﬁnd a very large technique eﬀect for CO2 emissions in transition economies. Their explanation refers to
the simultaneous heritage of devastated environmental resources and unsuccessful planned economies in ex-Soviet
countries. In particular, they mention a series of environmental stresses especially related to ex-communist countries,
many of them being linked with global pollutants such as greenhouse gases. Jobert et al. (2010) use the terminology
ecologists despite themselves for Eastern European countries that experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Overall, the positive coeﬃcient for GDP per capita is in line with most studies focusing on global pollutants and
in particular CO2, which represents the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions (see e.g. Lin and Li 2011 for a recent
assessment).
In line with expectations, a greater share of manufacturing implies higher emissions. Taking the coeﬃcient of
column (2), an increase of 1 percent in the share of manufacturing leads to an average increase in emissions of 2.2
percent, everything else ﬁxed (cf. e.g. Jobert et al. 2010 for a similar ﬁnding and discussion).
Trade openness is associated to a negative eﬀect. Since we control for the share of manufacturing in the economy,
we expect this eﬀect to be related with the technique eﬀect, i.e. the exposition of exporters to new markets with own
standards, the eﬀect of foreign investment and technology transfers. However, it is also possible that it accounts
for ﬁrm's relocation of dirty activities that is not fully captured by the control variables.
As expected, the coeﬃcient for trust is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. An estimate of 0.24 implies that
a change of 1 percent in trust (i.e. one percentage of respondents switching from the answer You cannot be too
careful in dealing with other people to the option Most people can be trusted) leads to a decline in per capita
greenhouse gas emissions of 0.24%12.
The coeﬃcient for trust is however not robust to the inclusion of energy consumption. That is, in model (2),
which adds energy consumption, the coeﬃcient for trust becomes non-signiﬁcant, as shown by column (3). This
result conﬁrms our previous discussion, since we expect trust to decrease energy consumption both directly and
indirectly. Regarding the coeﬃcient for energy, its sign is in line with expectations, as well as the boost in the
goodness of ﬁt. The estimate of column (3) implies that for one percent increase in energy consumption, emissions
increase by 0.8%, which makes sense since not all energy sources are related to all greenhouse gases in the same
way. This ﬁgure represents path B in Figure 1. We also see that all control variables are stable to the inclusion
of energy consumption, which is positive sign of robustness. The exception is GDP per capita, which turns out to
be negative. However, this comes as no surprise, since the scale eﬀect is likely to be captured by the coeﬃcient of
energy consumption, which controls for the dirty component of economic growth.
The last step for testing mediation estimates the impact of trust on energy consumption (path C). Estimates for
model (3) are shown by column (4). We ﬁnd that trust does indeed aﬀect energy consumption, and with a negative
sign. The coeﬃcient of -0.32 implies that a percentage increase in the level of trust would lead to a reduction in
energy consumption of about 0.3%. Control variables behave very similarly to model (1). Indeed, a larger share
of manufacturing is related with larger energy consumption, as well as GDP per capita. Abstracting from issues
of endogeneity, which are not crucial while dealing with controls, column (4) suggests that economic growth is
responsible for larger energy consumption, thus supporting the positive coeﬃcient on emissions.The coeﬃcient for
trade becomes instead non-signiﬁcant. Interestingly, it may imply that trade does not aﬀect emissions through the
level of energy consumption but through its content (i.e. the energy-mix), which may support the technique eﬀect.
Altogether, Table 2 provides evidence in favor of the role of energy consumption as mediator. Results also
rule out the mediation of the energy-mix. However, we take them as evidence that the largest eﬀect goes through
11In this sense we follow the standard approach in the literature, even though some conceptual doubts can be casted about the
plausibility of a technique eﬀect (cf. Roca 2003; Dinda 2004).
12This ﬁgure is robust to the addition of a time trend or time dummies. Results available upon request.
10
the level of energy consumption and not through its content, rather than as a case of perfect mediation. We also
perform some additional mediation regressions with a series of variables proxying technology or the energy-mix,
e.g. patents, dirty sources such as coal and oil, share of renewable energy, share of nuclear energy (cf. Roca et al.
2001, Buehn and Farzanegan 2013)13. Still, the coeﬃcient for trust is not aﬀected. Hence, we conclude that we fail
to ﬁnd evidence on the role of the energy-mix as mediator.
Since it is possible that trust has a delayed impact on emissions, we account for a non-simultaneous relation by
introducing lags between trust and emissions per capita. We expect that the inﬂuence of trust decreases with time
and we are interested to know how long the memory is inﬂuencing emissions. We ﬁnd however that including lags
do not substantially improve our model (results not reported here). We estimate an optimal lag for each time series
(i.e. for each country i) with a suﬃcient number of observations, borrowing from the tools of vector autoregression
(VAR) analysis. Only in a minority of cases the optimal lag exceeds the fourth lag. However, autocorrelation
is still present even at the fourth lag, according to a Lagrange-multiplier test. Hence, we prefer to rely on the
contemporaneous model presented here.
To illustrate the impact of trust on emissions, consider for instance Spain in 2007, which has emissions per
capita of about 9.8 tons of CO2-equivalent and a level of trust of 0.2 (i.e. 20% of respondents asserting that most
people can be trusted). If we iterate the marginal change of one unit in trust by using the coeﬃcient of column
(2) of Table 3 to have Spain attaining the level of trust of Sweden (i.e. from 20% to 68%), Spanish emissions per
capita would decrease by about 12.5% (i.e. 1.2 tons per capita)14. That is, if Spain would have the level of trust
of Scandinavian countries, their emissions would be by far smaller, ceteris paribus (i.e. assuming that the other
drivers of emissions would not be aﬀected by this large increase in trust). Despite recent evidence calls for emissions
reductions of about 40% with respect to 1990 and of 60% compared to 2010 to avoid dangerous interferences with
the climate system (see e.g. UNEP 2012), the magnitude of the eﬀect related to trust is considerably large for a
variable that was neglected until very recently and thus justiﬁes its inclusion as a determinant of greenhouse gas
emissions.
As discussed in Section 2, the impact of trust on energy consumption and thus emissions cumulates the impact
on individual behavior and environmental policy (paths C and D). Obviously, we would have preferred to disentangle
the two eﬀects, e.g. by isolating the role of environmental policy. However, environmental policy is very diﬃcult
to measure and proxies hardly capture the panoply of possible local and national eﬀorts. Yet, we consider some
indicators for domestic and international policy (i.e. top-down initiatives) such as Eurostat's total environmental tax
revenue and the climate-policy components of the Climate Change Cooperation Index and of the Climate Change
Performance Index15. Unfortunately, the overlap between our panel and the latter is too short for obtaining any
meaningful result. Instead, we are able to test for mediation with the remaining indicators. Although we ﬁnd a
negative eﬀect of both environmental taxation and the C3-I on the level of energy consumption, the coeﬃcient for
trust is unaﬀected. In addition, the estimate for the C3-I does not reach statistical signiﬁcance. Even though this
evidence does not play in favor of the policy channel, we recall that the variables used are only rough proxys for
the sum of local, regional and national eﬀorts towards curbing energy consumption and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
Hence, we look back to the WVS and examine the relationship between trust and collective action as expressed
13All variables come from Eurostat. Patents stands for patents applications to the European Patent Oﬃce. Results available upon
request.
14This implies a change in trust and emissions of about 3 standard deviations (cf. Table 1).
15Total environmental tax revenue is available e.g. as a percentage of GDP (cf. Costantini and Mazzanti 2012). The C3-I is developed
by Bernauer and Boehmelt 2013 and updates the Cooperation Index of Baettig et al. (2008). The C3-I's policy component evaluates
the eﬀorts of a country for the success of international negotiations, by giving marks based on commitments to the United Nations
Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reporting and ﬁnancing to the UNFCCC
structure. Instead, the policy component of the Climate Change Performance Index, released by Germanwatch, is based on local climate
change experts' opinions. The C3-I goes back until 1997 and encompasses 172 countries, whereas the Climate Change Performance
Index delivers reliable policy evaluation starting from 2006 (available in the index of 2007, cf. Burck and Bals 2012).
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by the following two questions: Would give part of my income for the environment and Increase in taxes if used
to prevent environmental pollution. In both cases the possible answers are: Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree
and Strongly disagree. 125 observations are available for the ﬁrst question (out of 35, by interpolation). If we
take the share of people answering Strongly agree and Agree to the ﬁrst question, the correlation with Trust
most people is positive (0.23) and signiﬁcant (at 1%). Regressing Give part of income on GDP per capita, the
time trend, ﬁxed eﬀects and trust leads to a positive coeﬃcient for trust (0.792, signiﬁcant at 1%). This suggests
that an increase of trust by 1% leads to an increase of about 0.8% of people accepting to forsake part of their
income for helping the environment. For the question on environmental taxation, we ﬁnd a correlation of 0.29
with trust, signiﬁcant at 1% (based on 192 observations out of 54). By regressing Increase in taxes if used to
prevent environmental pollution on income per capita, existing levels of environmental taxation, the time trend,
ﬁxed eﬀects and trust, we ﬁnd a coeﬃcient for trust of 0.581, statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. This coeﬃcient implies
that a change of 1% in trust leads to 0.6% increase in people strongly agreeing or agreeing to increase taxes used for
environmental purposes. Arguably, it implies being ready to give up part of their income. However, the correlation
between Give part of income for the environment and Increase in taxes is of only 0.7, leaving room for direct
pro-environmental behavior. Given the small set of observations and the previous ﬁndings, we take these ﬁndings as
descriptive evidence supporting the case for further analyses on the policy channel. That is, we thus leave for future
studies the task to measure the contribution of each of the two channels, as well as the net impact on emissions
(including the trust-to-growth eﬀect). In addition, one may see as appropriate to include trust in foreign people in
the analysis of the policy channel.
Another avenue for future research would consist in analyzing how societies can address the issue of trust and
foster the level of cooperation among individuals. Some recent works convey converging evidence emphasizing
the need to target the push factors determining environmental behavior through normative discourses (e.g. by
exhibiting the neighbors' level of cooperation), attempting to stimulate agent's trust in a shared eﬀort toward
climate change mitigation (see e.g. Cialdini 2003; Schultz et al. 2007; Steg and Vlek 2009; von Borgstede et al.
2013). More in general, reducing inequalities, improving institutional quality and enhancing education (especially
teaching cooperation) should contribute in building trust (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001). It is thus
important to use existing trust networks (see Catney et al. 2013a) but also to overcome social barriers impeding
the emergence of new ones (Catney et al. 2013b).
5 Conclusion
Recent contributions in the theory of collective action have shown that predicted non-cooperative attitudes in social
dilemmas sometimes fail to be veriﬁed in empirics. This fact is supportive for the new strand of research highlighting
the importance of social norms and social contextualization for understanding collective action. However, until
recently, social aspects of economic behavior related with environmental goods were conﬁned to local issues. Elinor
Ostrom eventually extended the concept revealing the extent of grassroots projects tackling climate change from
diﬀerent perspectives. This phenomenon was in the public eye, but an important contribution was necessary to
realize what has then become evident: struggling international negotiations are only a side of the coin of climate
change mitigation. Ostrom (2009) explains the willingness of many citizens to provide collective eﬀorts to curb
emissions as a result of trust among them, broadening the trust-and-reciprocation mechanism of commons.
We apply her insights and test for an aggregated eﬀect of trust on greenhouse gas emissions and oﬀer evidence
in favor of the Ostrom Hypothesis. Indeed, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of trust on emissions, based on a panel of 29
European countries over the period 1990-2007. The estimated negative elasticity implies that a percentage increase
in trust reduces emissions of 0.24%, by leading to a decline in energy consumption of about 0.32%. This impact is
not negligible, since it implies, for instance, that a level of trust similar to the one of Sweden would lead Spain to
a decline in emissions by about 10%.
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The correlation between trust and growth (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001) and the nexus we
ﬁnd from trust to emissions may explain why some economists attempted to link income growth with emissions. In
our opinion, trust and social values may contribute to answer to Esty and Porter's (2005) quest for an explanation
beyond the Environmental Kuznets Curve regarding cross-country diﬀerences in environmental quality. Hence, not
accounting for trust would lead to an omitted variable bias attributing to other variables, e.g. income per capita,
the eﬀect of trust and social values.
In conclusion, we agree with Elinor Ostrom and co-authors with the need of a paradigm shift in the way
environmental issues are analyzed from an economic perspective and in the choice of the relevant factors to be
considered.
Several caveats limit the interpretation of our results beyond their context and create the bases for further
research. First, we use an imperfect measure of trust, which is collected only occasionally. Second, we provide an
aggregated result, but we are not able to disentangle the ways that lead trust to be eﬀective in reducing emissions.
Third, we do not assess the net eﬀect of trust, which should encompass also the growth-driven impact on emissions.
Fourth, it is still largely unexplained how policymakers can aﬀect trust and social values, although some reviewed
contributions started to target the issue.
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Tables
Table 1: Dependent and independent variables: summary statistics
Variable Unit Mean Std Dev Min. Max. N
Greenhouse gas emissions per capita 103 tons of CO2 equivalent 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.035 539
Real GDP per capita Euros of 2000 19747.18 12622.49 1218.981 71428.57 438
Trust Share of positive answers 0.352 0.148 0.099 0.68 340
Manufacturing Share of GDP 0.197 0.056 0.075 0.453 460
Trade openness Share of GDP 0.494 0.250 0.165 1.764 484
Energy consumption per capita 103 tons of oil equivalent 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.014 538
Source: Own computations. See Table 4 for data sources.
Table 2: Empirical results based on model (1), (2) and (3)
Greenhouse gas emissions Energy consumption
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust -0.269** (0.114) -0.242** (0.110) 0.022 (0.744) -0.321*** (0.101)
Real GDP per capita -0.023** (0.011) 0.088*** (0.033) -0.070*** (0.024) 0.192*** (0.030)
Manufacturing 1.414*** (0.240) 2.241*** (0.344) 1.106*** (0.238) 1.384*** (0.317)
Trade -0.210*** (0.068) -0.569*** (0.115) -0.440*** (0.076) -0.157 (0.105)
Energy consumption - - 0.821*** (0.054) -
Constant -4.045*** (0.152) -5.080*** (0.333) 0.805* (0.446) -7.171*** (0.307)
Country ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 257 197 197 197
Countries 29 20 20 20
Within-R2 0.277 0.287 0.694 0.327
R
2 0.970 0.970 0.987 0.983
Source: Own computations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*,** and ***: signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
The dependent variable is greenhouse gas emissions per capita, in logs. Panels are unbalanced.
Columns (2) to (4) do not include transition economies.
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Table 3: Robustness tests for model (1)
Greenhouse gas emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust -0.242 * (0.140) * (0.146) ** (0.091)
Real GDP per capita 0.088 ** (0.035) ** (0.039) * (0.044)
Manufacturing 2.241 *** (0.297) *** (0.376) *** (0.490)
Trade -0.569 *** (0.095) *** (0.100) *** (0.122)
Constant -5.080 *** (0.363) *** (0.384) *** (0.438)
Standard errors - White Bootstrap Driscoll-Kraay
Source: Own computations.
Notes: Column (1) provides the coeﬃcients of column (2) in Table 2.
Remaining columns show standard errors (in parentheses) as deﬁned in the table.
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are estimated with default lags, T=18.
*,** and ***: signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95% and 99% conﬁdence levels, respectively.
Panels are unbalanced. Transition economies are excluded.
17
Table 4: Data source
Variable Database Eurostat table Measure Unit
Greenhouse gas emissions Eurostat env_air_gge Greenhouse gas emissions 103 of tons of CO2 equivalent
GDP per capita Eurostat nama_gdp_c Gross domestic product at current prices Euro per inhabitant
Trust World Values Survey - Most people can be trusted Percentage of positive answers
Manufacturing Eurostat
nama_gdp_c/
Manufacturing, value added Percentage of GDP
sbs_na_2a_mil
Imports Eurostat nama_exi_c Imports at current prices Percentage of GDP
Exports Eurostat nama_exi_c Exports at current prices Percentage of GDP
Energy Eurostat nrg_100a Gross inland energy consumption 103of tons of oil equivalent
Population Eurostat demo_pjan Population on January 1st Number of persons
Deﬂator Eurostat teina110 GDP deﬂator Index (2000=100)
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